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NOTE
A PROPOSAL FOR SETTLING THE INTERPRETATION OF
FLORIDA’S PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT
Lauren Rehm
Abstract
Although created to encourage settlement, few rules have generated
more collateral litigation than Florida’s proposals for settlement
provisions. While Florida Statutes section 768.79 creates a substantive
right to attorney’s fees, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 provides
a procedural enforcement mechanism. However, through its
unprecedented application of strict construction to a rule of civil
procedure, the Florida Supreme Court has arguably made it more
difficult to accomplish settlement by adding new requirements for valid
proposals. Thus, with collateral litigation looming over proposals for
settlement, burdening court dockets, and costing parties additional time
and expense, now is the time to realign the court’s interpretation of Rule
1.442 with the legislature’s intent to facilitate settlements.
This Note specifically addresses the recent demise of joint proposals
for settlement. Part I examines the history of Florida’s proposal for
settlement provisions. An overview of recent court decisions regarding
joint proposals highlights the implausibility that any joint proposal
could satisfy the rigid requirements demanded by the Florida Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Rule 1.442. Part II explores how strict
construction of Rule 1.442 is at odds with the court’s own interpretive
principles for rules of civil procedure. Because this unprecedented strict
judicial interpretation of a rule of civil procedure tends to blur the
distinction between substantive law and procedural mechanisms, Part III
discusses potential constitutional separation of powers implications.
Finally, Part IV offers a comparative analysis of Nevada’s proposal for
settlement statute and court rule to propose a framework for change in
Florida.
In conclusion, this Note suggests that the court’s reliance on strict
construction of a rule of civil procedure undermines the plain language
and intent of Florida Statutes section 768.79. The court would better
serve the purpose of proposals for settlement by adhering to the
principle that procedural rules are to be construed for the equitable and
just application of the substantive law.
 J.D. expected, May 2013, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am blessed to
have an amazing family who encourages me every step of the way. I could not be more grateful
for their constant love and support. Thank you to the members and staff of the Florida Law
Review for their dedication during the editing and publication process. A special thank you to
Professor Amy Mashburn for her invaluable insights.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the confusion surrounding proposals for settlement, this
much is certain: The road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Although created to encourage settlement,1 “‘proposals for settlement’
have become the plague of Florida’s civil justice system”2 as they
continue to spawn burdensome collateral litigation.3 Few rules have
generated more unintended consequences than those created by the
implementation of Florida Statutes section 768.79 and Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.442.

1. See Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646, 650 (Fla. 2010)
(explaining that the expected result of proposals for settlement “was to reduce litigation costs
and conserve judicial resources by encouraging the settlement of legal actions”); United Servs.
Auto Ass’n v. Behar, 752 So. 2d 663, 664 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the purpose
of proposals for settlement “is to encourage the resolution of litigation”).
2. Mark Roman Law Grp., Formal Settlement Offers in Florida: A Hopeless Debacle for
the Civil Justice System, ROMAN GAYNOR SCALES OF JUSTICE, http://www.clearwatercaraccidentlaw
yerblog.com/?p=142 (last visited Sept. 16, 2012).
3. See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 650 (stating that the effect of proposals for settlement “has
been in sharp contrast to the intended outcome because the statute and rule have seemingly
increased litigation as parties dispute the respective validity and enforceability of these offers”).
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Section 768.79 of Florida Statutes4 is Florida’s offer of judgment
statute. This provision creates a statutory entitlement to attorney’s fees
and court costs in civil actions when a party fails to timely accept a
settlement offer and specific criteria are met.5 While the statute creates
the substantive right, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 purports to
track the statutory language to provide a procedural enforcement
mechanism.6 However, Rule 1.442 (which refers to offers of judgment
as “proposals for settlement”) seems to go beyond creating pertinent
procedures by adding new requirements for valid proposals for
settlement. For instance, one of the most litigated areas of proposals for
settlement is joint proposals7—an area which Florida Statutes section
768.79 does not explicitly address. Despite the fact that the legislature
did not hinder such proposals, courts interpreting Rule 1.442 have
struck down many joint proposals as defective.8 For reasons such as
this, “Rule 1.442 continues to be the most litigated of the Rules of Civil
Procedure notwithstanding its intended purpose of reducing litigation by
encouraging settlements.”9
As the unintended consequences of proposals for settlement continue
to plague Florida courts, there is an increasing concern over “whether
either [Rule 1.442] or [Florida Statutes section 768.79] is fulfilling its
intended purpose of encouraging settlement or at times is having the
opposite effect of increasing litigation.”10 In its recent 2010 decision
Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka,11 the Florida Supreme
Court alluded to this concern regarding the effectiveness of the
provisions by quoting the lament of Florida’s Fourth District Court of
Appeal: “We regret that this case is just one more example of the offer
of judgment statute causing a proliferation of litigation, rather than
4. F LA. S TAT. § 768.79 (2011).
5. See id. § 768.79(1).
6. Saenz v. Campos, 967 So. 2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see also
Adams v. Wright, 403 So. 2d 391, 393–94 (Fla. 1981) (distinguishing substance, which is the
domain of the legislature, and procedure, which is the domain of the courts, by stating that
procedure “encompass[es] the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or
steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains redress for their invasion. ‘Practice
and procedure’ may be described as the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the
product thereof.”).
7. See F LA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(c)(3) (establishing that “[a] proposal may be made by or to
any party or parties and by or to any combination of parties properly identified in the proposal”);
Raymond L. Robin, What Is Left of the Joint Proposal for Settlement?, 85 F LA. B.J. 16, 17
(2011) (defining a joint proposal for settlement as “a single proposal made to or from multiple
parties”).
8. See Robin, supra note 7, at 22.
9. BRUCE J. BERMAN, BERMAN’S FLORIDA CIVIL PROCEDURE 728 (2010–2011 ed.).
10. Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223, 227 (Fla. 2007) (Pariente, J., specially
concurring).
11. 36 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 2010).
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fostering its primary goal to terminate all claims, end disputes, and
obviate the need for further intervention of the judicial process.”12
Although many issues surrounding proposals for settlement have
been recognized as ripe for review,13 this Note specifically addresses the
recent demise of the joint proposal for settlement. The demise of this
useful tool for ending disputes undermines the legislative intent behind
proposals for settlement. There are two different avenues toward
correcting this problem, and both avenues should be considered. First,
the Florida Supreme Court can adapt its current interpretation of
Rule 1.442 to better facilitate the purpose of encouraging settlement.
Second, the Florida Legislature can amend Florida Statutes section
768.79 to specifically address joint proposals for settlement. This Note
will pursue the first avenue, proposing that the most pragmatic means of
reviving the joint proposal as an effective tool for settlement lie in the
hands of the court.
Perhaps due to the Florida Supreme Court’s current strict
construction of Rule 1.442, the continuing trend is “that Florida courts,
more likely than not, strike down Proposals for Settlement when the
issue goes on appeal.”14 Thus, the good intentions of encouraging
settlement are seemingly forgotten. With collateral litigation looming
over proposals for settlement, burdening court dockets, and costing
parties additional time and expense, appellate courts have articulated the
12. Id. at 650 (quoting Sec. Professionals, Inc. v. Segall, 685 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Se. Floating Docks, Inc., 632 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2011).
The Eleventh Circuit Court recently certified three questions to the Florida Supreme Court for
clarification:
First, we inquire whether an offer of judgment may be viable when filed under
the following circumstances: the offer was filed by a defendant after a jury
verdict for the defendant had been set aside by the district court’s grant of a
new trial, and after the new trial date had been scheduled, but more than 45
days before the scheduled retrial; and the defendant ultimately prevailed
because the appellate court reversed the grant of a new trial and reinstated the
initial verdict. Second, we ask whether the term “joint proposal” in Rule
1.442(c)(3) applies to cases where acceptance of the offer is conditioned upon
dismissal with prejudice of an offeree’s claims against an offeror and a third
party. Finally, we seek a determination of whether the Florida offer of
judgment statute applies to actions filed in Florida, in which there exists a
contractually agreed upon choice-of-law clause providing for the application of
the substantive law of another state. We certify these questions because we are
unable to find definitive answers in clearly established Florida law, either case
law or statutory.
Id. at 1197.
14. Christopher B. Hopkins, Another Joint Proposal for Settlement Voided in
Florida . . . Concurrence Asks for Legislative Intervention, FLA. L. COMMENT. (Mar. 25, 2009),
http://www.floridalawcommentary.com/category/proposals-for-settlements.
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need for the Florida Supreme Court “to consider whether [R]ule 1.442
should be amended to align with the legislative intent that offers of
judgments . . . are meant to encourage settlements.”15
Part I of this Note examines the history of Florida’s proposals for
settlement provisions. An overview of recent court decisions regarding
joint proposals highlights the implausibility that any joint proposal
could satisfy the rigid requirements demanded by the Florida Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Rule 1.442. Part II explores how strict
construction of Rule 1.442 is at odds with the court’s own interpretive
principles for rules of civil procedure despite the reasons the court has
offered to justify an exception. Because this unprecedented strict
judicial interpretation of a rule of civil procedure tends to blur the
distinction between substantive law and procedural mechanisms, Part III
discusses potential constitutional separation of powers implications.
Finally, Part IV offers a comparative analysis of Nevada’s proposal for
settlement statute and court rule to propose a framework for change in
Florida.
In conclusion, this Note suggests that the Florida Supreme Court’s
strict construction of a rule of civil procedure undermines the plain
language and intent of Florida Statutes section 768.79—the statute that
Rule 1.442 is meant to implement. Rather than interpreting Rule 1.442
to require unyielding inflexibility, the court would better serve the
purpose of proposals for settlement by adhering to the well-established
interpretive principle that procedural rules are to be construed for the
equitable and just application of the substantive law.
I. THE HISTORY OF PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS
A. An Overview of Florida Statutes Section 768.79
In order to craft an enforceable proposal for settlement, Florida
Statutes section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 must
be read alongside one another.16 At the outset of this historical
overview, it is important to note the distinction between a statute and a
court rule. Substantive law is created by statutes; “statutes are
manufactured by a constitutionally authorized legislative body, and are
directed towards those who are constitutionally obligated to implement,

15. Cano v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 8 So. 3d 408, 411 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(Hazouri, J., concurring specially).
16. See, e.g., V. Julia Luyster & Jennifer Lodge, When Is a Joint Proposal for Settlement
a Valid Proposal for Settlement: Apportionment, Avoiding Ambiguity in Release Language, and
the Barnes Dilemma, 24 TRIAL A DVOC . Q. 12, 12 (2005) (explaining that “[d]rafting a valid and
enforceable joint proposal for settlement requires strict adherence to § 768.79, Florida Statutes
and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442”). See generally Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer
Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003).
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enforce, or follow the law.”17 In order to provide a mechanism for
enforcing the substantive law created by statutes, “courts possess an
inherent power to regulate proceedings and facilitate the administration
of justice by the promulgation of rules of practice.”18
Florida Statutes section 768.79 establishes the substantive law for
proposals for settlement.19 The statute provides in relevant part:
In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this
state, if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not
accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall
be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees
incurred by her or him or on the defendant's behalf
pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other contract
from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of
no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at
least 25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall set
off such costs and attorney's fees against the award . . . . If
a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not
accepted by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff
recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent
greater than the offer, she or he shall be entitled to recover
reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred from the date
of the filing of the demand.20
In other words, the statute creates an “‘entitlement’ to fees”21 for a
party who makes a proposal for settlement that is not accepted within
thirty days, and the proposal is ultimately 25% greater than or less than
the resulting court judgment depending on the party. After these basic
criteria are satisfied, the statute “provides four requirements that an
offer must fulfill in order to be used as the basis for an award of
attorney’s fees and costs.”22 First, the offer must be in writing and
17. Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretative Lessons from Positive
Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 S AN DIEGO L. R EV. 957, 958–59 (2007).
18. Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of
Judicial Rule Making, 55 M ICH. L. R EV. 623, 624 (1957). In Florida, this power of the courts is
rooted in the Florida Constitution, which states that “the supreme court shall adopt rules for the
practice and procedure.” F LA. CONST. art. V, § 2.
19. The Florida Legislature enacted a companion statute, Florida Statutes section 45.061,
in 1987. However, due to the confusion caused by three provisions (two statutes and one court
rule) simultaneously governing proposals for settlement, a 1990 amendment to Florida Statutes
section 768.7 incorporated various provisions of Florida Statutes section 45.061. After this
consolidation, the legislature effectively repealed Florida Statutes section 45.061. FLA. STAT.
§ 45.061(6).
20. F LA. S TAT. § 768.79(1) (2011).
21. Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
22. Katherine H. Miller, Note, A History of Apportioning Joint Offers of Judgment in
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reference Florida Statutes section 768.79.23 Second, the offer must
specify the names of the offeror and the offeree.24 Third, the offer must
“state with particularity the amount offered to settle a claim for punitive
damages, if any.”25 Fourth, the offer must “state its total amount.”26
Attorney’s fees and court costs should be awarded if the offer satisfies
these four requirements.27 However, even if a party is entitled to fees
under the statute, the court has discretion to reject an award if it
“determine[s] that an offer was not made in good faith.”28 Finally, the
statute specifies six criteria the court must consider in determining the
reasonableness of an attorney’s fees award.29
Although shifting attorney’s fees and court costs may arguably
penalize a party who rejects a proposal and fails to terminate
litigation,30 a proposal for settlement “is intended to be used as a tool to
encourage settlement not a tool of intimidation.”31 In fact, the Florida
Legislature enacted the statute in 1986 for the purpose of
“encourag[ing] parties to settle . . . without going to trial.”32 Thus, the
Florida: Is Willis Shaw Really the Bottom Line, or Is There an Exception?, 28 NOVA L. R EV.
841, 845 (2004).
23. F LA. S TAT. § 768.79(2)(a) (2011).
24. Id. § 768.79(2)(b).
25. Id. § 768.79(2)(c).
26. Id. § 768.79(2)(d).
27. See Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (stating
that “the legislature has created a mandatory right to attorney’s fees, if the statutory
prerequisites have been met”).
28. F LA. S TAT. § 768.79(7)(a) (2011); see also Sharaby v. KLV Gems Co., Inc., 45 So. 3d
560, 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that “the good faith requirement ‘insists that
the offeror have some reasonable foundation on which to base an offer’”) (quoting Schmidt, 629
So. 2d at 1039).
29. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(7)(b). The court must consider the following factors:
(1) The then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.
(2) The number and nature of offers made by the parties.
(3) The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.
(4) Whether the person making the offer had unreasonably refused to furnish
information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of such offer.
(5) Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions of farreaching importance affecting nonparties.
(6) The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the person making
the offer reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be
prolonged.
Id.
30. See Abbott & Purdy Grp. Inc. v. Bell, 738 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
31. Kaufman v. Smith, 693 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
32. Aspen v. Bayless, 564 So. 2d 1081, 1083 (Fla. 1990); see also Pirelli Armstrong Tire
Corp. v. Jensen, 752 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (summarizing that the staff
analysis prepared by the Florida House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary for House
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statute aims to persuade parties not to pursue litigation but rather to
avoid costs, attorney’s fees, and extensive time by settling.33
B. An Overview of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442
While Florida Statutes section 768.79 provides the substantive law
for proposals for settlement, “rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure presents the means of properly applying the statute.”34 Rule
1.442 was adopted in 197235 for the same purpose as the statute—“to
terminate all claims, end disputes, and obviate the need for further
intervention of the judicial process.”36 However, because of the rule’s
many discrepancies with the requirements of the statute, Rule 1.442
actually adds to the need for judicial intervention.37 The long history of
uncertainty resulting from the interplay between Rule 1.442 and Florida
Statutes section 768.79 was characterized by one judge as “one of the
most oblique areas of rule and law that I think I have ever seen.”38 Thus,
rather than attempting to fully chronicle each amendment and its
impact, this Section provides an overview of the most significant
developments in Rule 1.442.
Rule 1.442 was initially modeled after Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68,39 “the only federal rule devoted exclusively to
encouraging settlement.”40 In its original form, Rule 1.442 was exactly
the same as Federal Rule 68,41 which is an asymmetric cost-shifting
Bill 321 indicates the purpose of the bill was to “encourage settlement of civil cases which
could, in turn, result in lower litigation costs. Similarly, the Senate Staff Analysis and Economic
Impact Statement prepared for Senate Bill 866 indicates the bill’s purpose was to expand the
offer of judgment concept to encourage settlements between parties”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Nat’l Healthcorp Ltd. P’ship v. Close, 787 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(“The legislative purpose of section 768.79 is to encourage the early settlement and termination
of litigation in civil cases generally.”).
33. See Miller, supra note 22, at 843.
34. Id.; see also Julie H. Littky-Rubin, Proposals for Settlement: Minding Your P’s and
Q’s Under Rule 1.442, 75 F LA. B.J. 12, 12 (2001) (explaining that Rule 1.442 “provides the
mechanism to assert those rights [created by Florida Statutes section 786.79] and delineates the
proper procedure necessary for implementing the substantive statute”).
35. In re the Fla. Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So. 2d 21, 40–41 (Fla. 1972).
36. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989).
37. See Miller, supra note 22, at 847 (stating that “rule 1.442 does not fulfill its intended
purpose to alleviate the judicial system of its burdensome caseload; instead, it adds to it”).
38. Stouffer Hotel Co. v. Teachers Ins., 944 F. Supp. 874, 875 (M.D. Fla. 1995)
(Merryday, J.).
39. Abbott & Purdy Grp. Inc. v. Bell, 738 So. 2d 1024, 1027 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (stating that the “former Rule 1.442 was adopted using Federal Rule 68 as a model”).
40. Clinton A. Wright III, Note, Confusion in Florida Offer of Judgment Practice:
Resolving the Conflict Between Judicial and Legislative Enactments, 43 F LA. L. REV. 35, 37
(1991).
41. In re the Fla. Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So. 2d 21, 41 (Fla. 1972).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss6/8

8

Rehm: A Proposal for Settling the Interpretation of Florida’s Proposals

2012]

SETTLING THE INTERPRETATION OF FLORIDA’S PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT

1819

mechanism available only to defending parties.42 Because Federal Rule
68 only pertains to court costs and does not create an entitlement to
attorney’s fees, a defending party has little incentive to attempt a
settlement.43 Thus, Federal Rule 68 and its protégé have been largely
ineffective in reducing litigation.44
In 1989, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a new version of
Rule 1.442.45 This new rule came in the wake of the legislature’s
enactment of Florida Statutes section 768.79 and attempted to align
Rule 1.442 with the two-way fee-shifting statute.46 However, despite
good intentions, the adoption of the new rule failed to settle confusion
over the proper procedural requirements for a proposal for settlement.
The Florida Supreme Court attempted to alleviate this confusion in
Timmons v. Combs.47 In Timmons, the court explicitly recognized that
“the circumstances under which a party is entitled to costs and
attorney’s fees is substantive and . . . rule [1.442] can only control
42. See F ED. R. CIV. P. 68. The federal offer of judgment rule states:
(a) Making an Offer; Judgment on an Accepted Offer. At least 14 days before
the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an
opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs
then accrued. If, within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves
written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice
of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment.
(b) Unaccepted Offer. An unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn, but it does
not preclude a later offer. Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible
except in a proceeding to determine costs.
(c) Offer After Liability is Determined. When one party’s liability to another
has been determined but the extent of liability remains to be determined by
further proceedings, the party held liable may make an offer of judgment. It
must be served within a reasonable time—but at least 14 days—before the date
set for a hearing to determine the extent of liability.
(d) Paying Costs After an Unaccepted Offer. If the judgment that the offeree
finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must
pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.
Id.
43. See Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and
the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. R EV. 1561, 1566 (2008)
(observing that “the penalty for rejecting an offer is too small in most cases to be taken
seriously”).
44. See id. (explaining that Federal Rule 68 “is written in a way that makes it an
extremely poor tool for settlement promotion”); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, SURVEY OF
STATE OFFER OF JUDGMENT PROVISIONS 1 (2004), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cf
m?Section=Offers_of_Judgment&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=120 (referring
to Federal Rule 68 as a “toothless provision”).
45. See Fla. Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1989).
46. See Miller, supra note 22, at 847 (providing a brief historical overview of the
amendments to Florida’s proposals for settlement provisions).
47. 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992).
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procedural matters.”48 In an effort to reconcile troublesome distinctions
between the provisions, the court repealed Rule 1.442 and adopted the
procedural elements of Florida Statutes section 768.79.49 Ultimately,
however, the new version of Rule 1.442 did little to eliminate the
uncertainty surrounding proposals for settlement.
C. An Overview of Joint Proposals for Settlement
Rule 1.442 was again amended in 1996.50 This time, the court
adopted various requirements not specifically contemplated by the
substantive statute.51 In particular, the court adopted subsection (c)(3),
requiring apportionment for joint proposals.52 Although the 1996
amendments “were designed to create a coherent framework for
reconciling Florida’s offer of judgment law, and to end the proliferation
of litigation sabotaging the statute’s goal of ending claims and
disputes,” the amendments have not had that effect.53 In fact, the Florida
Supreme Court lamented:
Rule 1.442 was amended effective January 1, 1997, to set
forth specific procedures for effectuating a valid offer of
judgment, including the requirement that a joint offer of
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442 cmt. n.1.
See F LA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(c). This section of the rule requires:
(1) A proposal shall be in writing and shall identity the applicable Florida law
under which it is being made.
(2) A proposal shall:
(A) name the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties
to whom the proposal is being made;
(B) identify the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve;
(C) state with particularity any relevant conditions;
(D) state the total amount of the proposal and state with particularity all
nonmonetary terms of the proposal;
(E) state with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for
punitive damages, if any:
(F) state whether the proposal includes attorneys’ fees and whether the
attorneys’ fees are part of the legal claim; and
(G) include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 1.080(f).
(3) A proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and by or to any
combination of parties properly identified in the proposal. A joint proposal
shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party.

Id.; cf. F LA. S TAT. § 768.79(2) (2011) (requiring only that the offer (1) be in writing, (2)
identify the parties, (3) state with particularity any amount offered to settle any punitive
damages claim, and (4) state its total amount).
52. F LA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(c)(3).
53. Littky-Rubin, supra note 34, at 12.
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judgment state the amount and terms attributable to each
party . . . . It was the Court’s hope that the . . . amendments
to rule 1.442 would enable parties to focus with greater
specificity in their negotiations and thereby facilitate more
settlements and less litigation . . . . [S]ubdivision (c)(3) of
rule 1.442 has instead caused a proliferation of litigation
rather than obviate the need for further intervention of the
judicial process.54
Although Rule 1.442 now explicitly addresses joint proposals, “the
Florida Supreme Court limited the use of joint proposals for settlement
even before Rule 1.442(c)(3) became effective.”55 In Allstate Indemnity
Co. v. Hingson,56 the court struck down as defective a joint proposal
served by a single defendant to multiple plaintiffs because the proposal
failed to apportion the amount each plaintiff would receive.57 Although
Rule 1.442(c)(3) was not yet effective when the proposal was made, the
court invalidated the proposal and held that Florida Statutes section
768.79 requires “each party who receive[s] an offer of settlement is
entitled . . . to evaluate the offer as it pertains to him or her.”58 The
dissent disagreed with this reading of the statute, emphasizing that “[i]n
fact, section 768.79(2)(d) merely provides that the offer of judgment
must [s]tate its total amount.”59 However, the majority’s “strict
approach to joint proposals for settlement has been followed ever
since.”60
After the adoption of Rule 1.442(c)(3), the Florida Supreme Court
carried its strict approach even further in Lamb v. Matetzschk.61 In
Lamb, the court mandated apportionment among parties in joint
proposals for settlement “even when one party’s alleged liability is
purely vicarious.”62 However, such a requirement “is most problematic
because the liability of the defendants in [the vicarious liability] context
is coextensive and therefore incapable of being realistically
apportioned.”63 In a special concurrence, Justice Barbara Pariente
cautioned the court that its rigid interpretation of Rule 1.442 may fail to
54. Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 So. 2d 1037, 1043 (Fla. 2005) (Pariente, J., specially
concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
55. Robin, supra note 7, at 17.
56. 808 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2002).
57. See id. at 199.
58. Id. (quoting C & S Chems., Inc. v. McDougald, 754 So. 2d 795, 797–98 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000)).
59. Id. at 200 (Harding, J., dissenting) (quoting Bodek v. Gulliver Acad. Inc., 702 So. 2d
1331, 1332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
60. Robin, supra note 7, at 18.
61. 906 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2005).
62. Id. at 1042.
63. Id. at 1045 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only).
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“foster the primary goal of the rule and section 768.79 . . . which is to
encourage settlements in order to eliminate trials if possible.”64
Perhaps in recognition of the implausibility of the strict
requirement it imposed in Lamb, the Florida Supreme Court
amended Rule 1.442 in 2010. 65 Although the apportionment
requirement established by Rule 1.442(c)(3) is still problematic for
many parties who attempt to settle disputes through joint
proposals, 66 Rule 1.442(c)(4) now carves out an exception to the
apportionment requirement in the context of vicarious liability. 67 In
light of recent developments in the realm of joint proposals,
specifically in regards to the issue of joint proposals conditioned on
mutual acceptance, it may be time for the court to once again
reconsider its strict approach.
II. THE DEMISE OF J OINT PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT
Until relatively recently, collateral litigation surrounding joint
proposals for settlement primary focused on issues of
apportionment. It was not until 2008 that Florida appellate courts
first faced “the issue of whether a joint proposal for settlement could be
partially accepted; in other words, whether an offeree of a joint proposal
for settlement could settle the case where others included in the joint
proposal rejected it.”68 The certified conflict between the First District
Court of Appeal in Clements v. Rose69 and the Second District Court
of Appeal in Attorneys’ Title Fund, Inc. v. Gorka70 demonstrates how
the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision on this issue has weakened
the utility of joint proposals.
64. Id. at 1042–43 (Pariente, J., specially concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. See In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 52 So. 3d 579, 588 (Fla.
2010).
66. See Luyster & Lodge, supra note 16, at 12 (“Although the purpose of compliance with
the rule is to reduce or eliminate judicial intervention in the resolution of litigation, strict
compliance may not always be possible or even plausible without judicial intervention.”).
67. See Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 52 So. 3d at 588. Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(4) states:
Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(3), when a party is alleged to be solely
vicariously, constructively, derivatively, or technically liable, whether by
operation of law or by contract, a joint proposal made by or served on such a
party need not state the apportionment or contribution as to that party.
Acceptance by any party shall be without prejudice to rights of contribution or
indemnity.
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(c)(4).
68. Robin, supra note 7, at 20.
69. 982 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
70. 989 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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In Clements v. Rose, the First District Court of Appeal confronted
a joint proposal for settlement issued by a plaintiff dog bite victim to
the two defendant dog owners. 71 The proposal clearly apportioned
the amount demanded from each defendant to settle the suit, and the
proposal explicitly stated that it was conditioned on the acceptance
of both defendants. 72 Both defendants rejected the proposal, and the
plaintiff later received a verdict 25% greater than the amount of the
proposal. 73 The trial court denied an award of attorney’s fees under
the proposal for settlement provisions finding that the proposal
failed to state with particularity any relevant conditions as required by
Rule 1.442.74 In particular, the court found the proposal was ambiguous
as to whether each defendant could independently accept the proposal.75
The appellate court reversed, finding the proposal was not
ambiguous under the plain language of Rule 1.442 because the
proposal clearly stated that it was conditioned on joint acceptance. 76
Further, the court stated that “[a]lthough it is conditional, the offer is
as definite as it is within [offeror’s] power to make, because the
condition depends not on [the offeror’s] election, but on each [offeree’s]
election.”77 In its reasoning, the appellate court emphasized that
“Rule 1.442 is designed to facilitate settlements, not to render
settlement of a case impossible where there are multiple defendants.”78
In Attorneys’ Title Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, the Second District Court of
Appeal confronted the same issue of whether a joint proposal
conditioned on mutual acceptance is enforceable. In Gorka, a defendant
insurance company offered to settle the claims brought against it by a
married couple.79 In its proposal, the insurance company specified that
it would pay $12,500 to the wife and $12,500 to the husband to fully
settle all damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.80 The proposal was
conditioned upon the offer being accepted by both spouses.81 Neither
spouse accepted the proposal and the insurance company later prevailed
71. See Clements, 982 So. 2d at 731.
72. See id. at 731–32. The proposal read: “TOTAL AMOUNT OF PROPOSAL: SeventyFive Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($75,000.00), payable to Plaintiff, JAMES CLEMENTS;
(Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred and no/100 Dollars ($37,500.00) from Defendant,
BOBBY B. ROSE, and Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred and no/100 Dollars ($37,500.00)
from Defendant, MAUDEANNA ROSE).” Id.
73. Id. at 732.
74. Id. at 731–32.
75. Id. at 732.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 989 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2008).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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at trial.82 The appellate court upheld the denial of an award of attorney’s
fees to the insurance company under the proposal for settlement
provisions.83 Rather than emphasizing the purpose of Rule 1.442, as the
court did in Clements,84 the Second District Court of Appeal repeatedly
emphasized the importance of strictly interpreting the rule.85 The court
invalidated the proposal because it did not allow both offerees to
independently accept the offer.86
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the district court conflict by
accepting review in Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka.87 In
a per curiam opinion, the supreme court upheld the Second District
Court of Appeal’s decision that a proposal for settlement conditioned
upon mutual acceptance renders that proposal invalid because “neither
offeree can independently evaluate or settle his or her respective claim
by accepting the proposal.”88 The court relied on Lamb v. Matetzschk,89
stating that Lamb instructed that “an offer must be differentiated such
that each party can unilaterally settle the action.”90 Despite the plain
language of Rule 1.442(c)(3), which allows joint proposals so long as
the amounts and terms attributed to each party are defined, the court
found that joint proposals conditioned on mutual acceptance are
defective because such proposals are “the antithesis of a differentiated
offer.”91
Justice Ricky Polston’s dissent, which is joined by two other
justices, stressed the adverse consequences of the court’s strict position
against joint proposals conditioned on mutual acceptance.92 The dissent
urged that Gorka “effectively eliminates the ability to make joint
offers.”93 By imposing a prohibition against joint proposals for
settlement which is not found in the plain language of either the statute
or the court rule,94 the court failed to further the legislature’s goal of
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1214.
84. Clements v. Rose, 982 So. 2d 731, 732 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that
“Rule 1.442 is designed to facilitate settlements, not to render settlement of a case impossible
where there are multiple defendants”).
85. See Gorka, 989 So. 2d at 1213 (stating that “the statute and rule are strictly construed
in favor of the party against whom the penalty is sought”); id. at 1214 (reiterating the “penal
nature of section 768.79 and the strict construction that we must apply”).
86. Id.
87. 36 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 2010).
88. Id. at 649.
89. 906 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2005).
90. Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 651.
91. Id.; see also Schantz v. Sekine, 60 So. 3d 444, 445–46 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(summarizing the Gorka court’s analysis).
92. See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 652–54 (Polston, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 654; see also Schantz, 60 So. 3d at 446 (agreeing with the Gorka dissent).
94. See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 652 (Polston, J., dissenting) (“There is no prohibition against
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encouraging settlement.95 Rather, the court minimized incentives to
settle disputes by exposing parties to the risk of partial settlements.96
The dissent explained that “a party is motivated to settle an entire case
with all parties because the litigation is expensive, distracting, and
unpleasant.”97 However, if a party cannot condition a proposal for
settlement on the acceptance of all offerees, “then there may be little
incentive to partially settle.”98 The defendant insurance company noted
this concern in its appellate brief, stating:
Creating a blanket rule that joint acceptance conditions
make an offer invalid would run counter to the motivation
of many offerors to bring a complete end to litigation
. . . . Requiring parties to subject themselves to piecemeal
settlements that neither end the case nor reduce the cost of
litigation (or worse, fund the litigation against the offeror),
would discourage offers and run counter to the purpose of
the statute to encourage settlements.99
Thus, “[t]he only way then to settle these cases is to make joint
offers conditioned on all accepting . . . . This encourages settlement,
consistent with the intent of the statute, and should be enforced by the
Court as a valid condition of settlement.”100
In addition to its damaging impact on the utility of joint proposals as
tools for settlement, Gorka can also be criticized for its unsound
reliance on Lamb. “Although Lamb had held that each offeree must be
able to independently evaluate a proposal for settlement, no court had
previously held that each must be able to independently accept the
proposal.”101 This substantive right of independent control is noticeably
absent from the plain language of the Florida Statutes section 768.79,
which Rule 1.442 is meant to implement. The Gorka majority feared
that without this independent control, an offeree who is willing to
accept a proposal for settlement will be subject to court costs and
attorney’s fees because of the decision of an unwilling offeree.102
offers to multiple parties conditioned on joint acceptance within rule 1.442 or section 768.79,
Florida Statutes.”).
95. See id. (“Rule 1.442 implements section 768.79, which was enacted by the Legislature
for the purpose of encouraging settlements.”).
96. Id. at 654.
97. Id. at 653.
98. Id.
99. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Attorneys Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646
(Fla. 2010) (No. 08-1899), 2009 WL 1387807 at *2 (internal citations omitted).
100. Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 654 (Polston, J., dissenting).
101. Robin, supra note 7, at 21.
102. See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 651 (“[A]n offeree who desires to avoid exposure to the fee
sanction is restrained from doing so without the agreement of the other party and is therefore
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However, the dissent noted that “a proper interpretation of how the rule
and statute function” dispels this misplaced fear.103 Pursuant to Florida
Statutes section 768.79(4)104 and Rule 1.442(f)(1),105 a joint offeree who
wishes to settle would file a written notice of acceptance.106 Because the
proposal specifies that it is explicitly conditioned on the acceptance of
all offerees, the court would not have jurisdiction to enforce the
agreement. However, Florida Statutes section 768.79(6)(a)107 ensures
that the joint offeree who files notice of acceptance cannot be subject to
attorney’s fees and court costs. On the other hand, the joint offeree who
fails to file notice of acceptance is subject to attorney’s fees and court
costs.108
In the wake of Gorka, “litigants would be wise to avoid using the
joint proposal for settlement because it is fraught with pitfalls and has
been rendered obsolete by the case law.”109 The troubling demise of this
popular tool for settlement may be rooted in the equally troubling
judicial abandonment of established principles of interpretation for rules
of civil procedure.
A. Strict Construction at Odds with the Court’s Interpretive Standard
The Florida Supreme Court’s strict construction of a rule of civil
procedure is puzzling in light of the court’s own interpretative standard
for procedural rules. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.010 clearly sets
forth that procedural rules are to be construed to further the goal of
resolving litigation in a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” fashion.110
Further, the commentary to Rule 1.010 provides:
The direction that the rules “shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
forced to participate in litigation that could have been settled. Consequently, the offeree lacks
independent control over the decision to settle and conclude the litigation.”).
103. Id. at 653 (Polston, J., dissenting).
104. This section provides: “An offer shall be accepted by filing a written acceptance with
the court within 30 days after service. Upon filing of both the offer and acceptance, the court has
full jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.” F LA. S TAT. § 768.79(4) (2012).
105. This rule states that a proposal may be “accepted by delivery of a written notice of
acceptance within 30 days after service of the proposal.” FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(f)(1).
106. Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 653 (Polston, J., dissenting).
107. This section provides for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs only
“[i]f a defendant serves an offer which is not accepted by the plaintiff, and if the judgment
obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than the amount of the offer.” F LA. S TAT.
§ 768.79(6)(a) (2012).
108. See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 654 (Polston, J., dissenting) (“[I]f a plaintiff does not file the
requisite notice of acceptance, then the plaintiff who has not accepted is subject to the terms of
the costs recovery statute.”).
109. Robin, supra note 7, at 17.
110. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010.
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every action” has two courses. It is, first, a direction that if
a rule needs interpretation, the stated objective is the guide.
The direction recognizes that procedural law is not an end
in itself; it is only the means to an end. And that end is the
proper administration of the substantive law. Procedural
law fulfills its purpose if the substantive law is thereby
administered in a “just, speedy, and inexpensive”
manner . . . .
It is, next, a direction that each rule shall be applied
with that objective in mind, especially where the court may
exercise a judicial discretion.111
In other words, “the settled, formal principle within the rules
themselves for interpreting the rules is not one of strict construction—or
woodenly enforcing every failure to follow procedural rules—but
instead an equitable guide of just application.”112 Like the substantive
statute it is meant to enact, the stated objective of Rule 1.442 is “to
terminate all claims, end disputes, and obviate the need for further
intervention of the judicial process.”113 With that objective as a guide,
the interpretive standard established in Rule 1.010 instructs courts to
construe Rule 1.442 as a means to effect the “proper administration of
the substantive law.”114 On the contrary, courts may interpret Rule
1.442 as an “end in itself”115 by reading in additional requirements not
found in the plain language of the proposal for settlement statute or
court rule.116 Specifically, a judicially created requirement that
proposals cannot be conditioned on mutual acceptance does not fulfill
the purpose of the substantive law; rather, it discourages offerors from
ending disputes by exposing them to the risk of piecemeal settlement.117
It is also significant to note that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
are generally modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
therefore, federal case law may be considered in interpreting the
purpose and operative effect of various rules.118 According to Professors
111. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010 authors’ cmt.
112. Hauss v. Waxman, 914 So. 2d 474, 477 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Farmer, J.,
concurring specially).
113. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989).
114. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010 authors’ cmt.
115. Id.
116. See Attorneys Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646, 652 (Fla. 2010) (Polston,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “[t]here is no prohibition against offers to multiple parties
conditioned on joint acceptance within rule 1.442 or section 768.79, Florida Statutes”).
117. See id. at 654 (Polston, J., dissenting) (stating that if an offeror cannot condition an
offer on mutual acceptance “there may be little incentive to partially settle”).
118. See, e.g., Sheradsky v. Basadre, 452 So. 2d 599, 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Brief and Appendix of Respondent at 14, Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2007)
(No. 06-611), 2006 WL 2701071 at *14.
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Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller in Federal Practice &
Procedure:
There is no place in the federal civil procedural system for
the common law rule that statutes, and rules having the
force of statutes, that are in derogation of the common law
are to be strictly construed. Rule 1 requires the judge to
construe the rules liberally to further the cause of justice.
However, the judge must exercise this discretion soundly
and with restraint because a construction that ignores the
plain wording of a rule or fails to view it as part of the total
procedural system ultimately may prove to be as
detrimental to the system as an arbitrary or rigid
construction and, in the end, not further the goal of the
“just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.”119
In the face of this inconsistency, the Florida Supreme Court has
pointed to the derogation of common law doctrine and the penal nature
of proposals for settlement120 to justify its departure from its own
established interpretive standard. However, these grounds fail to
provide a solid justification for the court carving out an exception to its
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” directive for a single rule of civil
procedure.
B. Derogation of the Common Law Doctrine as Grounds for an
Exception
There is a longstanding tradition that statutes in derogation of the
common law must be strictly construed.121 Florida Statutes section
768.79 is in derogation of the common law because it creates an
exception to the “American Rule,” which requires that “all litigants,
even the prevailing one, must bear their own attorney’s fees.”122 The
119. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. M ILLER , F EDERAL P RACTICE AND
P ROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1029 (3d ed. 2004).
120. See Willis Shaw Exp., Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003)
(stating that Rule 1.442 should be strictly construed because the procedure is in derogation of
the common law and is penal in nature).
121. See, e.g., Hauss v. Waxman, 914 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Farmer, J.,
concurring specially) (providing a historical overview of the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions
regarding the construction of statutes dating back to 1943); see also Jefferson B. Fordham & J.
Russell Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 V AND. L. R EV.
438, 440–41 (1950) (tracing the historical origin of the derogation doctrine to English common
law cases of the seventeenth century and perhaps earlier).
122. B LACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also F LA. S TAT. § 768.79(1) (2012);
TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995) (“The Legislature has modified
the American rule, in which each party pays its own attorney’s fees, and has created a
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Florida Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he fundamental rule in Florida
has been that an award of attorneys’ fees is in derogation of the
common law and that statutes allowing for the award of such fees
should be strictly construed.”123 It is important to bear in mind that “the
court’s original basis for strict construction of attorney’s fees statutes
was the ancient canon of statutory construction involving legislative
changes in the common law.”124 Further, the court’s holdings did not
contemplate strict construction for rules of civil procedure, but rather
expressly referred to strict construction for statutory canons.125
Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc.,126 a case decided in
2003, was the first case to find that a rule of civil procedure should be
strictly construed.127 Without explanation for its unprecedented
expansion of strict construction,128 the Florida Supreme Court stated
that strict construction applies “because the offer of judgment statute
and rule are in derogation of the common law rule that each party pay
its own fees.”129
It makes little sense to carve out an exception to the well-established
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” interpretive directive on the basis of the
derogation of common law doctrine because a rule of civil procedure
should not create substantive rights in derogation of any law. 130 Rather,
the rule should simply provide a procedural mechanism to enforce the
statute.131 If Rule 1.442 is creating substantive rights in derogation of

substantive right to attorney’s fees in section 768.79 on the occurrence of certain specified
conditions.”).
123. Roberts v. Carter, 350 So. 2d 78, 78–79 (Fla. 1977) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
124. Hauss, 914 So. 2d at 475 (Farmer, J., concurring specially).
125. See Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Williams, 85 So. 2d 619, 623 (Fla. 1956) (“[T]he award
of attorneys fees is in derogation of common law and that acts for that purpose should be
construed strictly.”) (emphasis added); Weathers ex rel. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v.
Cauthen, 12 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 1943) (holding that statutes in derogation of common law
must be strictly construed).
126. 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003).
127. Id. at 278.
128. See Goldman v. Campbell, 920 So. 2d 1264, 1268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(Farmer, J., concurring specially) (noting that in Willis Shaw, “[w]ithout any explanation, the
supreme court simply asserted” that strict construction applied to a rule of civil procedure).
129. Willis Shaw, 849 So. 2d at 278 (emphasis added); see also Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906
So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 2005) (reaffirming a strict construction of Rule 1.442).
130. Ellen K. Lyons, Strict Construction of Civil Procedure Governing Settlement
Proposals, TRIAL LAWYERS SECTION OF THE HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION LAWYER
52 (2007), available at http://www.carltonfields.com/files/Publication/94db32e3-73bd-427f-aed0-342
3d5262da2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e4f77368-98b6-4b9a-ad18-376e650a315a/Strict%20
Construction%20of%20Civil%20Procedure%20Governing%20Settlement%20Proposals.pdf.
131. See Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1992) (stating that Rule 1.442 “can only
control procedural matters”).
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the common law, it should be declared unconstitutional.132
C. Penal Nature as Grounds for an Exception
Just as the Florida Supreme Court’s original basis for strict
construction of attorney’s fees statutes did not contemplate application
to rules of civil procedure, “[t]he court’s reasoning had nothing to do
with the idea that statutes for attorneys fees are penal in nature.” 133 The
shifting of attorney’s fees upon the satisfaction of various criteria is no
more penal in nature “than other consequences experienced routinely
and frequently in ordinary litigation.”134 Therefore, it is seemingly
inconsistent to require strict construction for Rule 1.442, but to leave
just and speedy construction for all of the other rules of civil
procedure.135
However, there is a noteworthy counterargument that the proposals
for settlement provisions are penal in nature. Specifically, one can argue
that “section 768.79 imposes a penalty for unreasonably rejecting a
settlement offer.”136 Thus, proposals for settlement create disincentives
to litigate by “applying pressure and creating risks for an opposing
party.”137 Counter to the American Rule, the shifting of attorney’s fees
becomes a punishment for a party who fails to correctly predict a jury’s
decision. Under this view that strict construction should apply to
132. See infra Part IV. See generally Lyons, supra note 130, at 52 (explaining rules of civil
procedure should not create substantive rights in derogation of any law); Martin H. Redish,
Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the Foundations of Modern Procedure,
64 F LA. L. R EV. 845, 855 (2012) (articulating that a “delicate balance between substance and
procedure . . . is central to the smooth functioning of a constitutional democracy”).
133. Hauss v. Waxman, 914 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Farmer, J.,
concurring specially).
134. Id. at 478. Judge Gary Farmer went on to explain that:
Every time the court enters a money judgment, an injunction or a decree, every
time it imposes costs, fees and interest, it vindicates the judgment with the
coercive force of final process. As a matter of routine coercion of law’s
decisions, individuals can have their property taken in a levy of execution, they
can be held in contempt, they can be made to pay a fine, and they can even be
incarcerated. All of this is surely penal in the sense that Willis Shaw uses the
term.
Id.
135. See Lyons, supra note 130, at 52 (noting the same inconsistency is pronounced in the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Goldman, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S320 (June 14,
2007)).
136. Hilyer Sod, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Exp., Inc., 817 So. 2d 1050, 1054 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
137. Ellen Koehler Lyons, Understanding Proposals for Settlement 8 (Client Article
published by Carlton Fields, 2006), available at http://www.carltonfields.com/elyons/?op=
publications.
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proposal for settlement provisions due to their penal nature, a legislative
solution to the recent demise of joint proposals would be most effective.
Arguably, the legislature would be in the best position to guide the
court’s application of strict construction by amending Florida Statutes
section 768.79 to specifically address joint proposals.
However, even if strict construction should apply to this one specific
procedural rule, Florida courts’ current reading of Rule 1.442 seems
inconsistent with the application of a rigid interpretative standard. Judge
Gary Farmer of the Fourth District Court of Appeal made this clear as
he expressed his hope that the Florida Supreme Court “will reconsider
its policy of strict construction of procedural rules like rule 1.442 and
make clear that strict construction of attorneys fees statutes means only
that judges have no power of interpretation to extend such statutes
beyond their stated terms and nothing else.”138 Imposing a requirement
that proposals for settlement cannot be conditioned upon mutual
acceptance is seemingly beyond the bounds of strict construction
because such a requirement expands both the statute and the court rule
beyond their stated terms.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL S EPARATION OF POWERS IMPLICATIONS
Not only does the Florida Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of a
rule of civil procedure stand in stark contrast to the court’s own
interpretive principles, it also blurs the distinction between substantive
law and procedural rule. “[B]ecause courts frequently must address
difficult questions of statutory construction in the context of a specific
fact situation involving a live controversy between or among litigants,
in the course of that effort, courts sometimes lose sight of the
implications of their decision for interbranch relations.”139 Thus, recent
decisions such as Gorka may raise constitutional separation of powers
concerns inadvertently created by the court.
As discussed in Part I of this Note, statutes and court rules serve
different functions and stem from the authority of different
governmental branches.140 “Article V, section 2(a), of the Florida
Constitution provides [the Florida Supreme Court] with exclusive
authority to adopt rules for practice and procedure in the courts of this
State. The Legislature, on the other hand, is entrusted with the task of
enacting substantive law.”141 When provisions combine substantive and
procedural aspects, the judiciary and the legislature must work together
138. Goldman v. Campbell, 920 So. 2d 1264, 1274 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (Farmer,
J., concurring specially).
139. Peter D. Webster et al., Statutory Construction in Florida: In Search of a Principled
Approach, 9 F LA. COASTAL L. R EV. 435, 521 (2008).
140. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
141. TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995).
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to ensure that neither branch encroaches on the other’s constitutional
powers.142
The Florida Supreme Court has previously noted that “the area of
attorney fees and sanctions in the offer of judgment process may well be
substantive.”143 At the very least, it is clear that “the circumstances
under which a party is entitled to costs and attorney’s fees is substantive
and [the Florida Supreme Court’s] rule can only control procedural
matters.”144 Florida Statutes section 768.79 establishes a “mandatory
right to attorney’s fees, if the statutory prerequisites have been met.”145
This mandatory right is substantive in nature.146 Essentially, Florida
Statutes section 768.79 “begins by creating an ‘entitlement’ to fees.”147
A party “shall be entitled” to attorney’s fees and court costs if two
perquisites are met: (1) the party serves a proposal for settlement that is
rejected or not accepted within thirty days, and (2) the offering party has
recovered a judgment that is at least 25% greater than or less than the
proposal for settlement.148 “No other factor is relevant in determining
the question of entitlement.”149
“That entitlement may then lead to an ‘award’ of fees. That award
may then be lost by a finding that the entitlement was created ‘not in
good faith,’ or the amount of the award may be adjusted upward or
downward by a consideration of statutory factors.”150 “When the
Legislature enacted section 768.79, it [made] a policy determination that
attorney’s fees should be recoverable under certain circumstances.”151
Therefore, the legislature designed the statute such that a court must
find a party is entitled to attorney’s fees when the statutory prerequisites
are met,152 unless the court determines the proposal was not made in

142. See id. at 611; Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992).
143. Leapai, 595 So. 2d at 15; see also Fla. Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil
Procedure, 550 So. 2d 442, 442 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that “it is not so clear that a sanction is
‘procedural’ when it imposes a ‘fine’ based on a percentage of an unaccepted offer, especially
when a party may have done nothing more serious than guessing wrong about a jury verdict”).
144. Timmons v. Comb, 608 So. 2d 1, 2–3 (Fla. 1992).
145. Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
146. TGI Friday’s, Inc., 663 So. 2d at 611 (noting that the legislature “has created a
substantive right to attorney’s fees in section 768.79 on the occurrence of certain specified
conditions”).
147. Schmidt, 629 So. 2d at 1040.
148. F LA. S TAT. § 768.79(1) (2012).
149. Schmidt, 629 So. 2d at 1040.
150. Id.
151. BDO Seidman, LLP v. British Car Auctions, Inc., 802 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001).
152. See F LA. S TAT. § 768.79(1) (stating that a party “shall be entitled to recover
reasonable costs and attorney’s fees” when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied); id.
§ 768.79(2) (listing the four prerequisites of a valid offer).
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good faith.153
In light of the Gorka decision, it is worth questioning whether a
substantive right to attorney’s fees serves any purpose if it cannot be
enforced.154 “Under the statute, the legislature intended to encourage
settlements and reduce litigation costs on society by providing that
prevailing parties who make a legitimate offer of judgment will have a
reasonable expectation of recovering their attorney’s fees”;155 however,
the Florida courts have frustrated this purpose by making settlement
more difficult to accomplish.156 By adding a requirement that the
legislature did not deem relevant in determining entitlement157 and
effectively rendering joint proposals for settlement useless,158 the
Florida Supreme Court has arguably infringed on the legislature’s
purview to create substantive law.159
This same separation of powers concern was raised in Heymann v.
Free.160 In Heymann, the First District Court of Appeal was constrained
by Lamb v. Matetzschk161 and the language of Rule 1.442(c)(3)162 to
invalidate a joint proposal for settlement that failed to apportion the
offer.163 Although the court in Heymann was confronted with the
judicially created requirement that joint proposals be apportioned, the
same concerns presented by the court could apply to the judicially
created prohibition against joint proposals conditioned on mutual
153. See id. § 768.79(7)(a)
154. See Schantz v. Sekine, 60 So. 3d 444, 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Thomas, J.,
specially concurring) (“This substantive right is meaningless, however, if it cannot be
enforced”).
155. Id.
156. See Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646, 654 (Fla. 2010) (Polston,
J., dissenting) (“[The Gorka decision] effectively eliminates the ability to make joint offers. In
many instances, a party is motivated to settle an entire case with all parties because the litigation
is expensive, distracting, and unpleasant. But if the case is going to continue, then there may be
little incentive to partially settle.”).
157. Id. at 652 (stating that “[t]here is no prohibition against offers to multiple parties
conditioned on joint acceptance within . . . section 768.79, Florida Statutes”).
158. Id. at 654 (urging that Gorka “effectively eliminates the ability to make joint offers”);
Schantz, 60 So. 3d at 446 (agreeing with Justice Polston’s dissent in Gorka).
159. See Benyard v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1975) (“Substantive law
prescribes the duties and rights under our system of government. The responsibility to make
substantive law is in the legislature within the limits of the state and federal constitutions.”). See
generally Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class
Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 F LA. L. REV. 617, 644 (2010) (emphasizing
that “[a]s a matter of . . . constitutional separation of powers . . . a court may not employ a rule
of procedure to alter the essence of the underlying substantive right being enforced”).
160. 913 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
161. 906 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2005).
162. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3) requires in relevant part that “[a] joint
proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party.” FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(c)(3).
163. Heymann, 913 So. 2d at 12.
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acceptance. The Heymann court cautioned:
In our view, the result in this case implicates the separation
of powers clause in Article II, Section 3 of the Florida
Constitution. Such a result will deprive [the offerors of the
proposal for settlement] of a significant attorney’s fee
award based on a requirement of rule 1.442 that is not
contained in section 768.79, Florida Statutes.164
The court also noted that a “rule of procedure cannot alter, amend or
eliminate an entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees authorized in
Section 768.79, Florida Statutes.”165 The court’s concern for separation
of powers implications seems even more pronounced if applied to a
judicially created requirement that is neither in the plain language of the
statute or the court rule. In Gorka, the court relied on Lamb to read into
Rule 1.442 a new requirement—the right of independent control for
offerees166—that likely alters, amends, or eliminates an offeror’s
entitlement to fees under Florida Statutes section 768.79. Thus, the
same separation of powers concern articulated in Heymann also arises
in Gorka.
It is important to note that an opposing separation of powers concern
may be raised: Perhaps, the legislature has infringed on the judiciary by
enacting procedural mechanisms through Florida Statutes section
768.79. The Florida Supreme Court has stated that “where a statute does
not basically convey substantive rights, the procedural aspects of the
statute cannot be deemed ‘incidental,’ and that statute is
unconstitutional.”167 However, Florida Statutes section 768.79 expressly
establishes a substantive right to attorney’s fees168 and therefore does
not fall into this category. It is also clear that Florida Statutes section
768.79 does not fall into the purely substantive category169 as it
establishes procedural time frames for acceptance of proposals. 170 Thus,
Florida Statutes section 768.79 does not fit exclusively into either a
procedural or substantive category. The court has stated “where a statute
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105,
106 (Fla. 1996) (rejecting a proposed amendment to Rule 1.442 which would enable courts to
determine “the entitlement to” fees because the legislature has made this determination as matter
of substantive law).
166. See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text.
167. Massey v. David, 979 So. 2d 931, 937 (Fla. 2008).
168. See F LA. S TAT. § 768.79(1) (2012).
169. See Massey, 979 So. 2d at 937 (stating that “[i]f a statute is clearly substantive and
‘operates in an area of legitimate legislative concern,’ [the Florida Supreme Court] will not hold
that it constitutes an unconstitutional encroachment on the judicial branch).
170. See F LA. S TAT. § 768.79(4) (stating that a party has thirty days to accept a proposal
for settlement from the time the proposal is filed).
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contains some procedural aspects, but those provisions are so intimately
intertwined with the substantive rights created by the statute, that statute
will not impermissibly intrude on the practice and procedure of the
courts in a constitutional sense.”171 Therefore, a separation of powers
argument that the legislature is unconstitutionally infringing on the
judiciary through the procedural aspects of Florida Statutes section
768.79 will likely fail.
In Timmons v. Combs,172 the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged
that the proposal for settlement statute has procedural elements, 173 but
the court did not invalidate the statute nor address any constitutional
separation of powers concerns. Rather, the court repealed its own rule of
civil procedure and adopted the procedural aspects of the statute into the
amended Rule 1.442.174 Thus, even if the prohibition against joint
proposals conditioned on mutual acceptance were entirely procedural in
nature, the Florida Supreme Court may have ceded its procedural
authority to the legislature in the proposals for settlement context.
An alternative reading is that Timmons implies that authorizing joint
proposals for settlement is substantive in nature, and should therefore be
explicitly authorized by the legislature. On this view, separation of
powers concerns would be most effectively addressed by the legislature
clearly defining the rights and responsibilities of parties in the realm of
joint proposals for settlement. Ultimately, however, the most pragmatic
solution to these separation of powers concerns is for the court to strive
to effectuate the legislative intent behind Florida Statutes section
768.79. In doing so, the court will be more inclined to interpret
Rule 1.442 in such a manner as to avoid altering, amending, or
eliminating any entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees which the
legislature did not prohibit as a means of encouraging settlement. One
way to begin this process is to look to the proposal for settlement
provisions and interpretative principles of other states.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEVADA ’S PROPOSAL FOR
SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS
Nevada is a forerunner in implementing statutory and procedural
provisions that further the goal of proposals for settlement (or “offers of
judgment,” as they are referred to in Nevada)—encouraging settlement.
Nevada Revised Statutes section 17.115 and Nevada Rule of Civil
171. Massey, 979 So. 2d at 937.
172. 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992)
173. See Timmons, 608 So. 2d 1 at 3 (explaining that Florida Statutes section 768.79 “does
contain procedural aspects which are subject to [the Florida Supreme Court’s] rule-making
authority”).
174. See id. (stating that the Florida Supreme Court “hereby adopt[s] the procedural portion
of section 768.79 as a rule of this Court effective as of the date of this opinion”).
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Procedure 68 set forth Nevada’s offer of judgment protocols and must
be read alongside one another.175 Despite minor differences between the
language of the statute and the court rule, “[a]s a general matter, [the
Nevada Supreme Court] construes the rules in harmony with the
statute.”176
Similar to Florida Statutes section 768.79, Nevada Revised Statutes
section 17.115 is also a two-way fee-shifting provision.177 The most
notable difference between the two statutes is that Nevada Revised
Statutes section 17.115 specifically addresses joint offers of judgment:
(6) Multiple parties may make a joint offer of judgment
pursuant to this section.
(7) A party may make to two or more other parties pursuant
to this section an apportioned offer of judgment that is
conditioned upon acceptance by all the parties to whom the
apportioned offer is made. Each party to whom such an
offer is made may serve upon the party who made the offer
a separate written notice of acceptance of the offer.178
Under the Nevada offer of judgment statute, an offeror may
condition an offer on the joint acceptance of the offerees. 179 If at least
one offeree does not accept the offer, then “[t]he action must proceed as
to all parties to whom the apportioned offer was made, whether or not
the other parties accepted or rejected the offer.”180 However, only those
offerees who rejected the offer will be subject to the fee-shifting
provisions of the statute.181 Offerees who accepted the offer are not
subject to these fee-shifting provisions, even if they fail to obtain a more
favorable judgment at trial.182 Ultimately, the statute exists to encourage
settlement: “[t]he purpose of section 17.115 is to place the risk of loss
on the offeree who fails to accept the offer, thus encouraging both offers
and acceptance of offers.”183

175. See McCrary v. Bianco, 131 P.3d 573, 576 (Nev. 2006).
176. Id.
177. However, unlike Florida Statutes section 768.79 which requires at least a 25%
differential between the rejected offer and the judgment at trial, Nevada Revised Statutes section
17.115 simply provides for fee-shifting when a “party who rejects an offer of judgment fails to
obtain a more favorable judgment.” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.115(4) (West 2011).
178. Id. § 17.115(6)–(7); see also NEV. R. CIV. P. 68(c) (addressing joint proposals).
179. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.115(7).
180. Id. § 17.115(7)(a).
181. See id. § 17.115(7)(b)(1).
182. See id. § 17.115(7)(b)(2).
183. Trs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Union Local 525 Health & Welfare Trust Plan v.
Developers Sur. & Indem. Co., 84 P.3d 59, 62 (Nev. 2004).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss6/8

26

Rehm: A Proposal for Settling the Interpretation of Florida’s Proposals

2012]

SETTLING THE INTERPRETATION OF FLORIDA’S PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT

1837

The Nevada offer of judgment court rule also exists “to encourage
settlement of lawsuits before trial.”184 Nevada’s Rule 68 is notable in
that it “introduced a tremendous degree of flexibility to parties that
choose to serve offers of judgment. This high degree of flexibility is
unique to Nevada . . . .”185 Rather than requiring an unyielding and rigid
construction of the procedural rule, the Nevada Supreme Court reads
Rule 68 alongside the offer of judgment statute “such that no part of the
statute is turned to mere surplusage.”186 Thus, Rule 68 fulfills its
purpose by properly administering the substantive law. Further, the
court’s practical interpretation of Rule 68 furthers legislative intent and
recognizes that “[t]he offer of judgment is a useful settlement device
which should be made available at every possible juncture where the
rules allow.”187
Although Nevada’s offer of judgment provisions are something of an
outlier, Nevada’s approach can be looked to as a model for judicial and
legislative cooperation in effectuating the true intent of offer of
judgment provisions. The Nevada Supreme Court’s pragmatic
construction of its procedural rule can provide instruction. Further, the
language of Nevada’s provisions embodies the interpretation advocated
by the Gorka dissent, and “[t]o interpret these provisions any other way
effectively eliminates the ability to make joint offers.”188 Nevada’s
flexible approach to offers of judgment maximizes the utility of joint
offers by recognizing that “if it would be futile to remove only some of
the parties from the litigation, it makes sense to require all parties to
accept the offer of judgment.”189 Thus, Nevada’s provisions promote the
early resolution of litigation by eliminating the risks of piecemeal
settlement that exist under Florida’s provisions.
CONCLUSION
Despite the good intentions of the Florida Legislature and the Florida
Supreme Court, proposals for settlement continue to generate more
litigation rather than settlement. In order to better effectuate the
intended purpose of Florida Statutes section 768.79 and Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.442, courts should uniformly apply the “just and
speedy” interpretive standard set forth in Rule 1.010. A pragmatic
184. Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 860 P.2d 720, 724 (Nev. 1993).
185. Craig Roecks, A Proposal to Clarify Rule 68 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure
Regarding Offers of Judgment, 7 NEV. L.J. 382, 382 (2007).
186. Albios v. Horizon Comtys., Inc., 132 P.3d 1022, 1031 (Nev. 2006).
187. Allianz, 860 P.2d at 724.
188. See Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646, 654 (Fla. 2010) (Polston,
J., dissenting).
189. See Micah S. Echols & Erik W. Fox, Offers of Judgment in Nevada: Best Friend or
Worst Enemy?, 2010 NEV. LAW. 25, 26 (2010).
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construction of Rule 1.442 will further opportunities for settlement
rather than hinder them, better enabling the procedural rule to enact the
substantive law.
Although the Florida Supreme Court labels its current interpretation
of Rule 1.442 “strict construction,”190 the distinctions between strict and
liberal construction have been blurred by decisions like Gorka. Instead
of striving to adhere to the often confusing and ill-suited strict
construction standard, the court should strive to promote justice and
interpret Rule 1.442 correctly by giving it its intended meaning.191 By
shifting the court’s focus to the purpose of the proposal for settlement
provisions, constitutional separation of powers concerns will likely be
eliminated as the court will be less inclined to expand the provisions
beyond their stated terms.
The Florida Legislature can aid the court by “clarifying parties’
rights and responsibilities in making and receiving offers of
judgments.”192 Like Nevada’s statute, Florida Statutes section 768.79
should specifically address joint proposals for settlement. The
legislature should make clear whether enforceability is determined by
apportionment, by the ability of each offeree to act independently, or
whether neither of those considerations is important.193 However, even
if the legislature does not offer such clarification, the Florida Supreme
Court, much like the Nevada Supreme Court, should make joint
proposals for settlement available at every junction the statute does not
prohibit. The court has the power to revive joint proposals as useful
tools for settlement by adhering to its own interpretive principle that
procedural rules are to be construed for the equitable and just
application of the substantive law. Thus, the court can “repave” the road
toward settlement by returning to, and effectuating, the purpose behind
Florida’s proposal for settlement provisions.

190. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
191. See Hauss v. Waxman, 914 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
192. Schantz v. Sekine, 60 So. 3d 444, 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Thomas, J.,
specially concurring).
193. See Barbara Busharis, One Offer, Indivisible? Florida Courts Continue to Clarify the
Limits of Joint Settlement Proposals, 30 TRIAL ADVOC . Q. 4, 5 (2011).
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